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COMMENTS
SURGEONS' LIABILITY AND THE CONCEPT
OF CONTROL
On December 17, 1957, Professor Israel Abrams was admitted to
the Einstein Medical Center, Philadelphia, on the surgical service of Dr.
Benjamin Lipschutz for elective gall bladder surgery. Professor Abrams
was placed in room 807. On the same day another patient, also named
Israel Abrams, was admitted and placed in room 342. On December 18,
Dr. Peter Chodoff, the hospital anesthesiologist, and Albert Kohn, head
technician in charge of the hospital's blood bank, working independently
of each other, checked the operating schedule for the following morning.
the date set for Professor Abrams' operation. Dr. Chodoff ordered the
blood bank to set aside two bottles of blood for Professor Abrams. Kohn
checked the hospital census and found Israel Abrams registered in room
342. Kohn ordered a blood specimen taken. About mid-afternoon on the
same day Kohn was informed that there were two Israel Abrams in the
hospital. Kohn discovered that Professor Abrams was in room 807 and
ordered a specimen of his blood taken. Professor Abrams' blood was Type
0, Rh-positive while the other Israel Abrams' blood was Type A, positive.
On the morning of December 19 a bottle of blood was placed in the
operating room for Professor Abrams' surgery as ordered. The label on
the bottle read "342 A Positive, Israel Abrams." Kohn was responsible for
the labeling. During the course of the operation Dr. Lipschutz severed an
artery and blood was required immediately. Kohn was summoned to the
operating room and asked by Dr. Chodoff about the apparent mislabeling.
Kohn stated that there had been a clerical error and that the blood was
the correct type to give Professor Abrams. Dr. Chodoff spoke to Kohn
through the operating room door. Kohn was standing about five feet away
in the adjacent scrub room. Professor Abrams died on January 4, 1958
as a direct result of the transfusion of the wrong type blood.
After a trial on the merits' the jury found that Dr. Lipschutz was not
individually negligent; that Dr. Chodoff was not individually negligent;
that employees of the Einstein Medical Center, other than Dr. Chodoff,
were negligent. Motions for a new trial against Einstein Medical Center
and Dr. Chodoff were dismissed but the court remanded for a new trial
on the liability of Dr. Benjamin Lipschutz stating that:
. . . Pennsylvania would countenance another basis of liability for
Dr. Lipschutz, that of vicarious liability for his agent Dr. Chodoff,
1. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964).
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whose sub-agent (Kohn) was negligent, all in the scope of their
respective employments . . . there is enough (evidence) here to permit
the question of whether Kohn became the agent of either doctor or
both of them, to go to the jury under proper instructions. 2
The case of Mazer v. Lipschutzs is but one example of the application
of the principles of agency in the field of medicine. Agency law is not,
of course, a new concept. Its major premise is that one individual may be
responsible for the negligent and/or intentional harm caused by another.4
Generally the basis of this liability is the control and power the responsible
party has over the injuring party.5 These parties are designated as "master
and servant" or "principal and agent" and often the ambit of liability will
depend upon which of these categories the parties come under. 7 The
nomenclature of the several jurisdictions is unimportant. Whether it be
called, "respondeat superior," "vicarious liability"9 or, as in Pennsylvania,
"captain of the ship"'10 the terminology denotes the same thing. The prin-
cipal, the party in direct charge, is responsible for all acts performed by
his agents in the course of carrying out the orders of, or furthering the
interests of the principal." Physicians and surgeons are principals like
other persons and as such are subject to the laws of agency. 12 In the
operating room the surgeon is in exclusive control of every activity and
every duty performed by the assisting staff. Most litigation concerns
acts performed either before, during or after an operation and courts are
divided as to the liability of the operating surgeon in these several areas.
I.
PRE-OPERATIVE LIABILITY
Whether a surgeon should be responsible for the negligent acts per-
formed by nurses, interns and other physicians in preparing the patient and
the operating room for surgery is perhaps the most controversial of the
three stages of operative liability. Support can be found to sustain either
a negative or positive position.13
In the case of Benedict v. Bondi14 the court held that a nurse's activities
in preliminarily cleaning the operating room, placing clean sheets on the
operating table, preparing gowns and gloves, sterilizing instruments and
2. Id. at 57.
3. 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964).
4. RESTATEMSNT (S4coND), AGENCY § 265 et seq. (1958).
5. Id. § 243 et seq.
6. Id. §§ 1 & 2.
7. It is not necessary to explore the distinctions that courts make between each
and the corresponding liabilities.
8. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
9. Ibid.
10. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964).
11. Supra, note 4.
12. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
13. 27 INs. CouNstL J. 156 (1960) ; 5 ViLs. L. Rvv. 290 (1959) ; 7 VILL.L. R~v.
283 (1961) ; See Annotation 60 A.L.R. 147 (1929).
14. 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956).
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placing the patient on the operating table were administrative or ministerial
acts performed as an employee of the hospital and not of the surgeon. This
case arose when a patient sustained burns from hot water bottles placed
under his feet while on the operating table and partly under an anesthetic.
Here Dr. Bondi successfully contended that he had no control over the
pre-operative preparation. On the other hand, in Rockwell v. Stone15 two
physicians were held liable under the following circumstances. Defendant
Dr. Kaplan was to remove a bursa from plaintiff's left arm. Under Dr.
Kaplan's instruction plaintiff was placed in a hospital in which defendant
Dr. Stone was the chief anesthetist. Dr. Kaplan advised Dr. Stone that a
general anesthesia be administered for the operation. Dr. Stone advised his
staff of the type of anesthesia to be used and was not in the induction room
when the plaintiff received the injection. Due to the negligence of the
anesthesiology staff in this regard plaintiff lost his left arm. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of
the plaintiff against Dr. Kaplan, holding the surgeon responsible as prin-
cipal for the negligence of the doctor in charge of administering the
anesthesia to the patient. It is noteworthy that in this case Dr. Kaplan
was not present in the induction room, nor was Dr. Stone, and aside from
prescribing the type of anesthesia to be used he was not involved in the
pre-operative activity.
The foregoing are Pennsylvania cases, the latter case representing the
current position of that state. Though it seems that the cases are prima
facie similar, the court in Stone made no reference to the Bondi decision.
In both cases the injury was inflicted during preparation for surgery, in
both cases the surgeon was not in the immediate area, and in both cases the
injury was inflicted by permanent members of the hospital staff. Any conflict
that could be raised by these cases, however, has since been resolved by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mazer v. Lipschutz.16 Pennsylvania has
taken a broad view of the liability of a surgeon for pre-operation mishaps.
Although many cases similar to Bondi in other jurisdictions have been
decided in favor of the defendant surgeons, the current trend is to broaden
liability in keeping with Lipschutz.17 As early as 1952 a North Carolina
court' s reversed its former position, holding that an operating surgeon
was liable under respondeat superior for the negligence of a hospital nurse.
The nurse had improperly administered the anesthetic which caused the
patient's death. The extreme of this trend can be found in the celebrated
California case of Ybarra v. Spangard.'9 Though this case more properly
falls into the second category, negligence during the operation, it still serves
as a prime example of this trend. Here the plaintiff sustained an injury
to a healthy part of his body while undergoing an operation. As the patient
was under anesthesia when the injury was inflicted, and thus unable to
15. 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
16. 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964).
17. Supra, note 13.
18. Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
19. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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determine who was responsible, the California court permitted the plaintiff
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an action against the doctors
and nurses participating in the operation and in his subsequent care.
In justification of its position the Ybarra court stated that the res ipsa
loquitur rule is based on the circumstances that the chief evidence of the
true cause of the injury is practically accessible to the defendant, whether
culpable or innocent, but inaccessible to the injured person. Although the
plaintiff in Ybarra was unconscious at the time of the injury, other jurisdic-
tions have allowed invocation of the doctrine in such instances as where the
surgeon has failed to remove glass, 20 a surgical sponge,21 or forceps22
from the body of a patient following an operation. Nonetheless many states
have denounced the applicability of this doctrine in cases involving medical
malpractice.23
An examination of Mazer v. Lipschutz, 24 and its companion case
Yorston v. Penne125 will provide a certain amount of predictability on the
future impact this trend will have on the practice of medicine. It will be
remembered that in Mazer the defendant surgeon could have been held
responsible for the mislabeling of a bottle of blood by the head of the
hospital blood bank. In Yorston the surgeon was likewise held for negli-
gent acts taking place prior to the operation. A junior intern, at the
direction of the surgeon, negligently took the case history of the plaintiff.
It was established that the intern was qualified to take the case history.
Nonetheless, due to this negligence, the report failed to show the patient's
allergy to penicillin. The injury was caused by repeated injections of.the
drug after the operation. As we parallel these two cases we find several
facts in common; the negligent acts giving rise to the injury were per-
formed outside the operating room, the acts were performed by permanent
employees of the hospital, the acts were more clerical in nature than medical,
the defendant surgeon was not present at the time the acts were committed
and had no direct control over the persons acting, and the negligent per-
sonnel in both cases were competent to otherwise perform the acts giving
rise to the litigation. From these facts we can conclude that a surgeon
cannot reasonably rely on hospital personnel to perform their several func-
tions capably.
II.
OPERATIVE LIABILITY
With regard to the question whether an operating surgeon should be
liable for the negligent acts of those assisting him done in the course of an
20. Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932).
21. Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932).
22. Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712 (1934).
23. McKinnon v. Polk, 219 Ala. 167, 121 So. 539 (1929); McGraw v. Kerr, 23
Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912) ; Wimpy v. Rogers, 58 Ga. App. 67, 197 S.E. 656
(1938) ; Williams v. Tarter, 286 Ky. 717, 151 S.W.2d 783 (1941) ; Barker v. Heaney,
82 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
24. 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964).
25. 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
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operation, a more unified answer can be found with an overwhelming
majority answering the question affirmatively. 26 A typical example can
be found in Aderhold v. Bishop,2 7 wherein an Oklahoma appellate court
upheld a judgment by a lower court against an operating surgeon for the
negligence of nurses assisting in the operation. Here the plaintiff received
severe burns when hospital nurses placed a pan of hot water too close to
the patient's feet during the course of the operation. In its affirmation the
court stated:
... While the head nurse and her assistants were general employees
of the El Reno Sanitarium, they were nevertheless, during the time
required for the actual operation, under the direction and supervision
of the operating surgeons, and were the servants of the operating
surgeons in respect to such services as were rendered by them in the
performance of the operation, and for any negligence on the part of
such employees in the performance of such services the operating
surgeons are liable.28
Pennsylvania formally adopted this view in 1949 in the case of
McConnell v. Williams,29 wherein the operating surgeon was held liable
for the negligence of an intern in placing an overdose of chemical in a
baby's eye following delivery of the baby by the defendant. This court
held that the surgeon had complete control of the operating room and that
such supreme control is essential in view of the high degree of protection
to which an unconscious patient is entitled. It could be argued from the
words of the decision in McConnell that the "supreme control" being so
essential, it will be attributable to the operating surgeon whether he has
it at the time of the injury or not. Indeed Mr. Justice Stern stated in
his opinion that the operating surgeon is in the same complete charge
of those who are present and assisting him as the "captain of a ship over all
on board."30 In those minority jurisdictions not imputing liability to the
surgeon during the operation, the injury is generally caused by a nurse,
as in Covington v. Wyatt.8 ' Here the surgeon held a new-born baby while
the nurse placed a silver nitrate solution of unsafe quantity in the baby's
eyes. The court concluded that the nurse was acting as an employee of
the hospital and affirmed a non-suit in favor of the surgeon. It should be
noted, however, that this case was decided in 1928 and the jurisdiction
has since reversed its position. 32 This turn towards liberal liability is
presently the trend in most jurisdictions and cases denouncing the liability
of surgeons for the negligent acts of assistants during the operation are
becoming increasingly rare.
26. 27 INs. CouNsEL J. 156 (1960); See Annotations 46 A.L.R. 1454 (1927);
60 A.L.R. 147 (1929).
27. 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923).
28. Id. at 206, 221 Pac. 754.
29. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
30. Id. at 362, 65 A.2d 246.
31. 196 N.C. 367, 145 S.E. 673 (1928).
32. See Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
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III.
POST-OPERATIVE LIABILITY
The third category, responsibility for the negligent acts of assistants
after the operation, is the one area where courts are least willing to impose
liability. Again we may look to Pennsylvania as representative of the
liberal view.33 Two cases relating to this problem reached the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in 1950. In the first case, Shull v. Schwartz,3 4 the
court held that the liability of a surgeon does not apply, after the operation
is concluded, to treatment administered by floor nurses and interns in the
regular course of services ordinarily furnished by a hospital. Here the
injury was inflicted by an intern while removing the stitches pursuant to
the instructions of the surgeon but when the surgeon was absent. The
second case, Scacchi v. Montgomery,34a provided a somewhat closer ques-
tion, but the court did not deviate from its former position. The plaintiff
had been operated on by the defendant in the afternoon. The operation
was concluded by 2:30 p.m. At 4:30 p.m. the patient began to hemorrhage
and the defendant again operated. About 11 o'clock that evening the
patient developed pulmonary manifestations. The defendant was called but
before he could reach the hospital the patient died. The court held that
the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the
hospital nurse or intern in their post-operative treatment of the patient,
and that even if the plaintiff had met his burden of proof, under the facts
of this case the defendant could not be held responsible. The general
reason given for not imposing liability for post-operative injuries is that
the surgeon does not have the same control or charge as he has over acts
and duties performed in the operating room 5 or in the preparatory stages
of the operation.36 This is not to be confused with the fact that the surgeon
can still be liable for his own negligence in failing to detect acts injurious to
the patient inflicted by hospital personnel during post-operative recovery.3 7
The reluctance of courts to impose post-operative liability is not
confined to acts occurring in the patient's room, however. The court in
Hunner v. Stevenson,38 held that the surgeon would not be liable for the
negligence of hospital surgeons, nurses and interns who left gauze in a
wound while dressing it after the operation proper had been concluded.
Another situations ° found the operating surgeon working over the patient
just after the operation to save him from heart failure. At the same time
33. See 7 VILL. L. Rev. 283 (1961), for a survey of the Pennsylvania cases and
their 'position in contrast with the other states.
34. 364 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 402 (1950).
34a. 365 Pa. 377, 75 A.2d 535 (1950).
35. Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910) ; Hunner v. Stevenson, 122 Md. 40,
89 Atl. 418 (1913) ; Reynolds v. Smith, 148 Iowa 264, 127 N.W. 192 (1910)
Malkowski v. Graham, 169 Wis. 398, 172 N.W. 785 (1919).
36. Ibid.
37. See Hale v. Atkins, 215 Mo. App. 380, 256 S.W. 544 (1923).
38. 122 Md. 40, 89 Atl. 418 (1913).
39. Marchand v. Bertrand, Qu6. B.R.; 39 QuE. C.S. 49 (1910).
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a nurse burned the patient with overheated bricks. The court held that
the emergency required the surgeon's attention and he must leave minor
details to the nurse. But note that this case was decided in 1910 in a
foreign, though common law, jurisdiction. It serves to point out that there
are such cases repQrted, but in view of the present trend they should not
be relied upon as substantial authority.
The current trend toward increasing vicarious liability in the area
of medicine does not stop with the surgeon. The following survey will
show a tremendous increase in the liability of both public and private
hospitals for the negligent acts of those employed by the hospital.
Whether a hospital can be vicariously liable for the torts of doctors
has been the subject of a great deal of litigation during the past few decades.
It has generally been held in most jurisdictions that the relationship of
master and servant does not extend to hospitals and its doctors. 40 The
reason most commonly offered for this proposition is that doctors have
such a high degree of skill in their field that they must necessarily exercise
discretion in the performance of their duties and are therefore sufficiently
free of hospital control to be independent contractors. 41 This time honored
position is now in a state of change.
To digress momentarily to the federal level, Federal District Courts in
Pennsylvania in 195842 and New York in 195443 have included physicians
within the meaning of the term "employees" in the Federal Employers
Liability Act and have recognized the imputation of their torts. On the
state level the following cases evidence the growing tendency of those
courts to impose liability for the torts of physicians. In Andrews v.
Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n,44 the negligent acts of an intern
could be imputed to the hospital that employed him. In the last fifteen
years California,45 Minnesota, 46 Mississippi,
47 Wisconsin, 48 and New York49
have either partially or completely rejected the position that a doctor can
never be considered a servant. The one saving factor in this expansion of
liability is that most courts still hold that'a hospital cannot be held account-
able for the negligent acts of surgeons"0 and hospital personnel5' assisting
surgeons during the course of an operation.
If courts are so willing to impose liability on hospitals the next ques-
tion raised is concerned with the status of the cherished doctrine of charit-
40. Pearl v. West End St. R.R., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N.E. 339 (1900) ; Moore v.
Lee, 109 Tex. 391, 211, S.W. 214 (1919); an extensive annotation setting forth the
position of the majority appears in 19 A.L.R. 1183 (1922).
41. Ibid.
42. Dunn v. Conemaugh & Black Lick R.R., 162 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
43. O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 122 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
44. 77 Ohio L.Abs. 35, 147 N.E.2d 645 (1956).
45. McGuigan v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 482, 277 P.2d 444
(1954).
46. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
47. Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947).
48. Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438,20 N.W.2d 108 (1945).
49. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.S.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
50. Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957).
51. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. 1922).
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able immunity. Alas, this age old defense is currently in a state of deterior-
ation. It would be beneficial to note here that the defense of charitable
immunity has never, except in unusual cases, been applicable to privately
owned and operated hospitals and sanitariums. 52
The general reasons advanced for allowing charitable immunity were
recently stated in the Michigan State Court opinion in Parker v. Port
Huron Hospital.53 In its review of the doctrine, the court stated that it
was based on the theory that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inappli-
cable to charitable institutions because: (1) they are entitled to govern-
mental immunity, (2) there is an implied waiver of assumption of the risk,
and (3) simply on the grounds of public policy. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court evidenced this basis for the immunity in the noted case of Kojis v.
Doctor's Hospital,54 wherein it stated that the doctrine was originally based
on the public policy of Wisconsin to encourage such quasi-public institutions
which could not function without immunity. However, this same court
went on to say that times have changed, the hospitals "are now larger in
size, better endowed, and on a more sound economic basis." 55 The
immunity had been abolished in Wisconsin. The abolition of the doctrine,
however, can be traced back to 1942 and the case of President and Directors
of Georgetown College v. Hughes,5 6 and what Dean Prosser has referred to
as a "devastating" opinion 57 by Judge Rutledge. Prior to the Kojis case
charitable immunity had been revoked in eighteen states.58 A study of
these cases, their facts and opinions would be unduly long and of little
value. What is of significance is the fact that courts are abolishing it at
an alarming rate, although it is interesting to note that Pennsylvania has
left any change in the position of that state regarding charitable immunity
to the legislature. 59
Our final question must necessarily be: What recourse is available
to physicians and hospitals held responsible for the negligent acts of others
on the basis of respondeat superior?
The Restatement of Agency 2d6 ° provides that when a principal is
subjected to suit by a third person for the negligent or other wrongful acts
of his agent, said agent is liable to the principal for the loss which results
therefrom. This will include payment of fines to the state for a crime as
well as damages paid to third persons by the principal. "Thus, a servant
who, while acting within the scope of employment, negligently injures a
third perso-i, although personally liable to such person, is also subject to
52. 124 A.L.R. 186 (1940).
53. 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
54. 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
55. Id. at 372, 107 N.W.2d 134.
56. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
57. PROSSER, TORTS 784 (2d ed. 1955).
58. 45 MARQ. L. Rrv. 128 (1960).
59. Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958).
60. § 401, comment d (1958).
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liability if the principal is thereby required to pay damages."' Regarding
those cases holding the principal responsible for the actions of subagents,
the Restatement imposes liability on the agent as well as the subagent for
any payments required of the principal for the injurious conduct of the
subagent. 62 The foregoing rules have been adopted in the Federal District
Courts68 as well as in Pennsylvania, 64 New Jersey,6 5 Massachusetts,66
and New York.67 The Restatement indicates that this is a majority view
as it well should be.
IV.
CONCLUSION
We must conclude by going beyond the cases and examining the
possible repercussions that can result from this broad concept of liability.
We have seen cases imposing a high degree of care and liability upon
surgeons. Their effect might well be to limit the number of operations a
surgeon would undertake, in that much of. his time would have to be spent
in checking and cross-checking the preparatory acts of assistants and
hospital personnel in order to protect himself from liability. Although
quackery, unwarranted surgery and lack of due care will be curbed, one
might validly ask whether these problems have proved so great that this
heavy burden should be placed upon the operating physician. This imposi-
tion does not engender any greater standard of care required of hospital
employees, and although it provides greater assurance to the patient, should
not the legal remedy heighten the burden of care on those who have acted
negligently and who often work beyond the effective perimeter of the
surgeons' control?
We have also seen the decline and fall of the defense of charitable
immunity, heretofore a much used avenue of escape for public hospitals.
With ever increasing contributions of cash and services to such hospitals
and the advent of Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Major Medical Insurance
the defense has little chance for survival. Hospitals, as well as physicians,
will now have to carry increased malpractice insurance. As the trend con-
tinues, the cost of such insurance will rise. Hospital personnel must like-
wise be covered. Their premiums might often be paid by the employer as
a condition precedent to employment. The cost of maintaining a hospital
will increase, the cost of practicing medicine will increase, and ultimately
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 240 (1958).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 406 (1958).
63. Hornstein v. Kramer Bros., 133 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1943) ; Standard Brands,
Inc. v. Bateman, 184 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942, 71 S.Ct.
505 (1951).
64. Muldowny v. Middleman, 176 Pa. Super. 75, 107 A.2d 173 (1954); Klein v.
May Stern & Co., 144 Pa. Super. 470, 19 A.2d 566 (1941).
65. Burns Bros. v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, 202 F.2d 910 (N.J. 1953).
66. Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 331 Mass. 366, 119 N.E.2d 169(1954).
67. O'Maire, Inc. v. The Yaka, 79 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). For a survey of
the case law in this area see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY APPENDIX (1958).
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this will leave our patient with a higher hospital bill, a higher doctor's bill.,
higher premiums on Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Major Medical Insurance.
We have left all parties concerned paying higher costs and have engen-
dered a vicious circle of insurance, compensation, indemnification, contribu-
tion and a false sense of security. Ultimately the entire business may become
so hopelessly complicated that socialized medicine may seem refreshing.
Albert P. Massey, Jr.
QUANDARY IN THE LAW: THE NOT SO IMPARTIAL
PENNSYLVANIA JUROR
Discussions for and against the abolition of trial by jury have
been waged since the beginning of this century, and defects have been
shown to inhere in the system. So far no plan has been developed to
take its place that will meet public approval, and so long as the Consti-
tution provides for a jury as a fact-finding medium, our efforts must be
directed to keep this part of our judicial system above reproach. The
jury's efficiency and integrity must be maintained on the highest plane
if we are to prevent its forced abandonment and the embarking upon
an unchartered course of experimentation with other untried methods.
It is the duty of jurors to so act that their conduct will not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute and to perform with fidelity
their duties as fact finders in accordance with the evidence presented,
uncorrupted by external influences, and free of all bias and prejudg-
ment, especially that arising from sympathy.'
I.
INTRODUCTION
The right to trial by jury in Pennsylvania is embodied in two sections
of the state2 Constitution: Article I, Section 6, providing that "Trial by
jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate"; and
Article I, Section 9, affirming the right in criminal prosecutions to "a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage." By the former
section, the right is preserved intact as it existed at common law at the
time of adojtion of the Constitution," and, while the latter is qualifiedly
1. Mr. Chief Justice Kephart, in Hostetler v. Kniseley, 322 Pa. 248, 253-54,
185 AtI. 300, 303 (1936).
2. The provisions of the United States Constitution governing jury trials are
not binding on the states. Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 48 S.Ct. 468 (1928) ;
Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 24 L.Ed. 436 (1877); Commonwealth v. Reilly,
324 Pa. 558, 188 Att. 574 (1936).
3. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961);
Watson's Appeal, 377 Pa. 495, 105 A.2d 576 (1954) ; Commonwealth v. Wesley, 171
Pa. Super. 566, 91 A.2d 298 (1952). As to what characteristics are protected, see
Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 29-30, 198 At. 99, 111 (1938). For an
interesting history of the applicable provisions, see Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa.
558, 566-75, 188 Att. 574, 578-81 (1936).
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phrased to embrace only criminal actions, it is merely declaratory of the
common law and the elements embraced within it apply to civil actions
as well. 4 Whatever criticism may be directed at the jury,5 it remains a
perennial and seemingiy irreplaceable fixture in the common law. The
system justifies its existence as an instrument for the resolution and inter-
pretation of conflicting factual presentations solely through its presumed
objectivity and indifference to the ultimate result. This comment will
examine the judicial controls, procedural and substantive, on the im-
partiality of the juror in Pennsylvania law.
II.
HISTORY
The jury system is best understood when studied against the back-
ground of its historical development. It is generally agreed that early
juries were selected from among persons living in the area where the
transaction in question took place and presumably familiar with it.6 The
verdict was originally supposed to be a sworn statement as to what actually
had occurred. 7 Contrary to being impartial, the juror was in reality a
witness, permitted to influence his verdict by private knowledge and, in
fact, able to return a verdict although no evidence be offered on behalf
of either litigant.8 While a witness is no longer competent to be a juror
and the present day verdict must be based on evidence presented in court,9
the contemporary unanimous verdict may be traced directly to the juror-
witness concept. Originally, the rule required literally that twelve jurors
had to agree in order to bring in a verdict. If the selected panel did not
succeed in this, additional persons were added until twelve were found to
agree, a procedure known as "afforcing the assize" and amounting really
only to the procurement of a quantum of proof. 10
Until the late seventeenth century, a party who felt he was aggrieved
by a verdict could test it only by the process of attaint, whereby a second
panel of twenty-four members was called to rehear the evidence and render
a verdict. If this second verdict differed from the first, the members of the
4. See Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7 W.&S. 415, 422 (Pa. 1844).
5. See, e.g., Andrews, Legal Realism and the Jury, 1961 CRIM. L. Rzv. 758;
Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Riv. 1099
(1953); Note, A Condemnation of the Jury System and a Possible Alternative,
21 U. PITT. L. Rev. 52 (1959). For an article favoring the uninterrupted perpetuation
of the jury system, see Fuchsberg, A Brief for the Jury in Civil Cases, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1964, § 6 (magazine), p. 34.
6. FORSYTH, TRIAL By JURY 134-35 (2d ed. 1875); MOSCHZISKR, TRIAL By
JURY § 59 (2d ed. 1930).
7. The word "verdict" is derived from the Latin "veredictum," literally a true
declaration. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
8. FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 134-37; MOSCZISKXR, op. cit. supra note 6,
at § 59.
9. Commonwealth v. Joliffe, 7 Watts 585 (Pa. 1838). See also PA. STAT. AxN,.
tit. 17, § 915 (1962).
10. FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 197-98; MOSCIIslSR, op. cit. supra note 6,
at § 61.
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former jury would be fined, arrested and imprisoned, or suffer land for-
feiture on the theory that they had sworn falsely and were in contempt of
court."' While this sanction undoubtedly acted as an incentive to objec-
tivity, it was abolished; and the first modern new trial, granted in 1665,12
laid the cornerstone for the modern procedural methods employed to test
the verdict of the jury.
III.
GENERAL PUBLIC BIAS
The selection of an impartial jury necessarily rests on the presupposi-
tion that the populace from which it must be chosen is not so inflamed as
to make it impossible to draw such an array. Also, public opinion, indigna-
tion, or hysteria may reach such a point, particularly in this era of mass
news media, that it becomes difficult for a chosen panel to render a just
but unpopular decision without fear of approbation from their neighbors.'
3
The motions for continuance 14 and for change of venue' 5 are proper to
remedy this situation. While the constitutional right to a jury trial includes
the right to have the jury selected from the "vicinage,"' 6 the meaning of
this term is qualified by the' impartiality requirement, as clearly enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Reilly.17 The Reilly case
involved the trial of a number of law enforcement officials for the alleged
felonious assault on a prisoner. Since the district attorney was a defendant,
the Attorney General entered the case as prosecutor and petitioned the
Supreme Court to change venue1 8 because of a concerted public movement
11. FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 149-55; MOSCHZISKER, op. cit. supro note 6,
at §§ 290, 364.
12. MOSCIIZISKER, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 364. There is some dispute as to
whether the attaint verdict actually resulted in reversal of the original verdict. See
FORSYTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 149-50.
13. While this problem occurs most frequently in criminal cases, particularly sex
crimes and murders, fear of a biased populace is not unknown in civil litigations,
notably those involving large corporations and insurance companies.
Even patently guilty criminals have a right to a trial in a fair and impartial
atmosphere. A conviction will be reversed if the trial judge permits spectator demon-
strations. Commonwealth v. Hoover, 227 Pa. 116, 75 Atl. 1023 (1910). But see
Commonwealth ex rel. Sleighter v. Bannmiller, 392 Pa. 133, 139 A.2d 918 (1958).
There is now a statutory penalty imposed on demonstrations in or near court-
rooms, in addition to the power of punishment for contempt. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4327 (1963).
14. See Commonwealth v. Balles, 160 Pa. Super. 148, 50 A.2d 729 (1947).
15. Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 195 Ati. 62 (1937) ; Commonwealth
v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 At]. 574 (1936). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 551 (1964).
See also note 18, infra.
Where there is an objection to the form or manner of selecting the panel, without
regard to the qualifications of the individual jurors, a challenge to the array is proper.
Commonwealth v. Zell, 81 Pa. Super. 145 (1923).
16. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. "Vicinage" is a historical concept directly traceable
to the ancient juror-witness idea. Supra, text accompanying nn.6-8. See MoscHzisKER,
op. cit. supra note 6, at § 395.
17. 324 Pa. 558, 188 Atl. 574 (1936).
18. The Supreme Court has the power to change the venue of a case on a petition
of certiorari. This is a common law power and remains unaffected by statutes or
constitutional changes. Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 Atl. 574 (1936)
Commonwealth v. Ronemus, .205 Pa. 420, 54 Atl. 1095 (1903).
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on behalf of the defendants, involving newspaper articles, fund raising
campaigns, political and social influence, and even threats of violence
against Commonwealth witnesses. Stating that the Constitution does not
give a right to a trial before a partial jury, the Court held that "vicinage"
must be interpreted flexibly, unlimited by political boundaries such as
county lines, so as to encompass whatever area is necessary to secure
impartiality, and granted the change of venue. The area of the impartial
vicinage having been delineated, any jurisdiction from within it may be
selected for venue purposes.
Objections based solely on a prevailing public sentiment must be
promptly raised or waiver will result.'9 As early as 1844 a new trial
motion, based on the prejudicial atmosphere in the area, was refused where
counsel knew or could have known through due diligence of the public
hostility but made no motion for change of venue or continuance, despite
the fact that the Court acknowledged that public opinion was in such a
state that either motion would probably have been granted.20 It was stated
that a new trial would be granted in such circumstances only on the
presentation of "strong and unexceptionable evidence, free from all sus-
picion," of subjective, immutable prejudication on the part of the jurors
themselves. 21 Later cases have been in accord in requiring that post-trial
objections to the influence of public feeling on a verdict be supported by
clear proof of actual effect on the jury itself.22
IV.
THE INDIVIDUAL
InI seating the individual juror the law neither expects nor requires
literal impartiality in the sense of absolute indifference or ignorance of
the pending. case. 28 The vicinage requirement obviates the fact that many
jurors will have received some information, and they may have formed
an opinion or predisposition to one side founded upon that information.
However, a prospective juror is not automatically disqualified because he
declares that he has formed an opinion regarding the case on which he
will sit, provided he further convinces the court that his opinion is not
fixed and that he will render a verdict according to the evidence presented
in court.24 An exception to the general rule is the potential juror in a
19. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7 W.&S. 415 (Pa. 1844).
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 421.
22. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 130 F. Supp. 270 (M.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd,224 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 454, 76 S.Ct. 965 (1956) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Sleighter v. Banmiller, 392 Pa. 133, 139 A.2d 918 (1958).
23. The literal definition of "impartial" is: "Not partial; esp., not favoring one
more than another; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable; fair; just." WEBSTER,
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959).
24. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958); Common-
wealth v. DePalma, 268 Pa. 25, 110 Atl. 756 (1920) ; Commonwealth v. Nye, 240
Pa. 359, 87 Atl. 585 (1913) ; Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899).
In Commonwealth v. DePalma, 268 Pa. 25, 110 Atl. 756 (1920), a juror was
accepted for service, although he said that he felt that persons of defendant's ancestry
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criminal case who has formed an opinion after hearing or reading the
evidence presented at a former trial of the same defendant, rendering him
incompetent to serve even though his opinion may not be fixed.25
The distinction between a disqualifying fixed opinion and one which
will yield to contradicting evidence is narrow, and the ultimate determina-
tion of the competence of the juror lies in the discretion of the trial judge.2 6
On some occasions, a juror who originally professed to having made a firm
prejudgment of the case was admitted to the panel after probing questions
by the judge elicited a different and more objective response, no objection
apparently being found with this practice27 despite its seemingly preju-
dicial nature.
The prohibition against fixed opinion is not limited to the prospective
juror but extends throughout the trial. A juror may form an opinion
during the trial and before all the evidence and argument has been
presented, but it is cause for disqualification if the opinion becomes fixed
and unamenable to subsequent proof.28
In criminal cases the Commonwealth extends the right to an impartial
jury in what might be abstractly stated as the same degree to which it is
granted the defendant. Questions of unpopularity of a prosecution aside,29
the state may be further troubled by individual scruples in matters of
proof and punishment. Not so strangely, in view of the continual emotional
were prone to murder, where he also stated that he thought he could be guided by
the evidence. But see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 195 Ati. 115 (1937).
A fixed opinion automatically disqualifies the juror. Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332
Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1939).
If a juror has misled a party on voir dire questioning and evidence discovered
later shows that he had an opinion which would have justified a challenge, a new
trial will be granted. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 117 At. 192 (1922).
Even a statement that some evidence will be required to change the juror's opinion
is insufficient to require rejection. Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 100 A.2d
467 (1953). But see Commonwealth v. Sushinskie, 242 Pa. 406, 89 Atd. 564 (1913).
25. Staup v. Commonwealth, 74 Pa. 458 (1874). But the juror's opinion must
be formed from reading all of the testimony and not merely fragments of it. Also,
hearing or reading the evidence at a preliminary examination does not satisfy the
disqualification, since it is not a trial within the rule. Allison v. Commonwealth,
99 Pa. 17 (1881). Reading the evidence of the trial of a coconspirator does not render
the juror subject to challenge. Commonwealth v.' Taylor, 129 Pa. 534, 18 Atl. 558(1889). See also Commonwealth v. House, 3 Pa. Super. 304 (1897) (owner of news-
paper whose editorials had repeatedly declared defendant guilty disqualified).
26. Commonwealth v. Schoenloeber, 96 Pa. Super. 76 (1929) ; Commonwealth v.
Bentley, 287 Pa. 539, 135 AtI. 310 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434, 128
Atl. 77 (1925).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ryan v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 613, 616-17, 192
A.2d 362, 364 (1963) ; Clark v. Commonwealth, 123 Pa. 555, 16 Atl. 765 (1889).
28. Curley v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 151 (1877) ; Commonwealth v. Sallagher, 3
Clark 127, 4 Pa. L.J. 511 (1839) ; Goodright v. McCausland, 1 Yeates 372 (Pa. 1794).
An extreme example of this rule's invocation is Schonhardt v. Pittsburgh, 340 Pa.
-155, 16 A.2d 421 (1940), where a new trial was granted because a juror had nodded
her head vigorously in response to a rhetorical question posed by the trial judge
during his charge to the jury. The judge had given the charge relating to burden
of proof but had not as yet reviewed the evidence when he asked: "Has plaintiff met
that burden?" The court said that the reaction made it clear that the defendant
could not receive an impartial trial at the hands of the juror.
29. In Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 At. 574 (1936), the right of
the Commonwealth to secure a change of venue when public opinion is so heavily on
the side of the defendants as to make it impossible to secure an impartial jury or
enable the jury to act without fear of recrimination was established.
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opposition to the death penalty, the bulk of the problems arise in capital
cases. Since the fixed opinion prohibition applies to every main issue of a
case and is not dependent upon a prejudgment of the overall outcome, the
conscientious objector to capital punishment may be challenged for cause.30
Likewise, a juror may be disqualified if he states he will refuse to follow
the rules of law for personal reasons. Instances of this have arisen where
the prospective juror has maintained that he could not convict of a capital
crime on circumstantial proof,3 ' or could not apply in such a case the
ordinary rule as to reasonable doubt but must be convinced beyond any
doubt,3 2 or could not apply the felony-murder rule to a coconspirator.
3 3
Several procedural technicalities relating to the disqualification of a
prospective juror are worth mentioning at this point. The primary respon-
sibility for the selection of the neutral panel rests with the trial judge and
he may reject a juror on his own motion, although no objection is raised
by either party.3 4 A challenge for cause requires a discretionary ruling by
the trial court, but if it is refused, the juror may still be removed through
the exercise of a peremptory challenge3 5 The exercise of the peremptory
challenge in this situation is important, since error in overruling the chal-
lenge for cause will be waived unless peremptory challenges are exhausted.3 6
That the courts are anxious to keep the jury system as far removed
from criticism as is practically possible is evident. An area of serious
concern and difficult control in this regard is the overt conduct of the
juror during trial. It has been indicated that certain actions performed
in the public eye may in themselves be sufficient to warrant the disqualifica-
tion of a juror or the granting of a new trial, based solely on the fact that
the proscribed activity might bring the processes of justice into disrepute
though not amounting to a manifestation of a fixed judgment or prejudice.3 7
In Schankweiler v. Pennsylvania Light Co.,3 8 a wrongful death action,
plaintiff incidentally testified as to a bookkeeping method she employed
in her business. As she left the witness stand, a juror was heard to remark
30. Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1939) ; Commonwealth v.
Lesher, 17 S.&R. 155 (Pa. 1827). See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in
Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Riv. 1099, 1105 et seq. (1953). On the problem of
conscientious scruples concerning other issues, see Commonwealth v. Zoltowski, 246
Pa. 406, 92 At. 496 (1914).
31. Commonwealth v. Sushinskie, 242 Pa. 406, 89 Att. 564 (1913).
32. Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434, 128 Atl. 77 (1925).
33. Commonwealth v. Bentley, 287 Pa. 539, 135 At. 310 (1926). For an article
condemning the ".issue approach" with reference to the death penalty challenges, see
McClelland, Conscientious Scruples Against the Death Penalty in Pennsylvania, 30
PA. B.A.Q. 252 (1959).
34. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 242 Pa. 372, 89 Atl. 567 (1913). See also
Commonwealth v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 1110 (1892).
35. Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 100 A.2d 467 (1953). Common-
wealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,§§ 811-13 (1930).
36. Commonwealth v. McGrew, -375 Pa. 518, 100 A.2d 467 (1953); Common-
wealth v. Bibalo, 375 Pa. 257, 100 A.2d 45 (1953). See Commonwealth ex rel. Ryan
v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 613, 617, 192 A.2d 362, 364 (1963).
37. Schankweiler v. Pennsylvania Light Co., 275 Pa. 50, 118 'Ati. 562 (1922).
See also cases dealing with juror separation, infra notes 45-52.
38. 275 Pa. 50, 118 Ati. 562 (1922).
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to her: "I like your way of doing business." The juror was reproved by
the trial judge but not removed. On appeal, a new trial was granted on
grounds that the remark tended to show a sympathy for plaintiff, even
though it did not bear on the material issues of the case or indicate a fixed
predisposition toward the ultimate findings.
In other cases, where the trial considered in its entirety was a fair
one and the evidence amply supported the verdict reached, the court has
been somewhat reluctant to overturn for juror misconduct of this type,
thereby treating the verdict as curative of the error.8 9 Important in this
area is the rule that a party discovering misconduct is obliged to bring it
to the attention of the trial judge immediately and may not wait until a
verdict is reached, gambling on a favorable decision.40 By waiting, the
right to object is waived and a motion for new trial will be denied. When
charges of prejudicial conduct are brought to the attention of the judge,
he must halt the trial to investigate them, declaring a mistrial if they are
substantiated and proceeding if they are not.41
In the area of controlling juror conduct, the courts do not seem
unmindful of the fact that they are dealing for the most part with laymen,
untrained in the law and subject more often to ignorant mistakes than to
culpable ones.42 For example, although jurors are instructed to discuss
their case with no one during the frequent intermissions in a trial, some-
thing more than the mere proof of a few offhand remarks is necessary to
get more than a reprimand for the wayward talesman.4 3 Gossip, while
reprehensible, is not alone sufficient to require a new trial if the remarks
do not evidence bias or are not of such a character as to bring scandal
on the administration of justice.44
The only area in which the courts have exerted any stringent personal
control over the movements and contacts of jurors has been with regard
to separation during the trial of a. capital case or during deliberations in
other cases,45 and there appears to be a trend to relax even this practice.
Originally, even though the defendant might not object, jurors in felony
cases were not permitted to separate for any reason, and if separation
occurred, this was sufficient grounds for a new trial.46 The inflexibility
of this early rule was soon modified to permit separation in non-capital
cases47 and even in capital cases, but only so far as was necessary to permit
39. Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 At. 682 (1896) ; Commonwealth v.
Cummings, 45 Pa. Super. 211, 216 (1911). See Goodright v. McCausland, 1 Yeates 372(Pa. 1794) (even though juror bet on the outcome, must prove this biased his verdict).
On the other hand, juror misconduct is a factor to be considered in reviewing the
overall fairness of the trial. Mix v. No. Am. Co., 209 Pa. 636, 59 AtI. 272 (1904).
40. See Commonwealth v. Clay, 56 Pa. Super. 427 (1914).
41. Mix v. No. Am. Co., 209 Pa. 636, 59 Atl. 272 (1904).
42. See Hostetler v. Kniseley, 322 Pa. 248, 254-55, 185 At. 300, 302-03 (1936).
43. See Leavitt, The Jury At Work, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 415, 432-36 (1962).
44. Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 Atl. 682 (1896). See also Heiss v.
Lancaster, 18 Lanc. L. Rev. 289 (Pa. C.P. 1898).
45. See Mix v. No. Am. Co., 209 Pa. 636, 59 Atl. 272 (1904).
46. Peiffer v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. 468 (1850).
47. See Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck, 265 Pa. 251, 108 Atl. 635 (1919).
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the jurors to perform their duties,48 including separation for sleeping
quarters49 and medical care.50 In contrast to the usual rule that prejudice
must be shown to gain a new trial, separation of the jury in a capital
case creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendant which
the Commonwealth must overcome by clear evidence. 51 Presence of court
officers during the separation has proven of some importance in ruling on
similar fact situations, apparently with a tendency to give the official super-
vision itself evidentiary value in refutation of the prejudice presumption.52
An attempt to examine the activities apart from the juror's own
attitudes and conduct which the law proscribes in attempting to maintain
impartiality would be beyond the scope of this comment. It may be noted,
however, that the law does not expect that the influences of exposure to
normal everyday living will cease for the duration of a juror's service.53
Aside from normal conversation, perhaps the most serious problem faced
is the effect on the juror attributable to publicity of the litigation.5 4 Human
error again plays a part in the applicable rules and, without proof of actual
prejudice, a verdict will not be overturned simply because a juror has
heard or read reports of the proceedings, or has even recounted and
commented on the testimony. 58 Embodied in this is the recognition that
the principles of freedom of speech and of the press make it impossible to
control the source of the information and results in a dependence somewhat
upon the responsibility of journalism. 6 Should it appear that this responsi-
48. Commonwealth v. Kosh, 305 Pa. 146, 157 Atd. 479 (1932).
49. Commonwealth v. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144, 29 Atl. 404 (1894).
50. Goersen v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 477 (1884) ; Commonwealth v. Lamattina,
51 Berks Co. L.J. 125 (Pa. O.&T. 1959).
51. Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 37 Atl. 521 (1897) ; Moss v.
Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 267 (1884).
52. Compare Moss v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 267 (1884), with Commonwealth
v. Fisher, 226 Pa. 189, 75 Atl. 204 (1910).
53. By ancient common law, jurors were kept as prisoners of the court. The
practice today in non-capital and civil cases is to let them move freely. Common-
wealth v. Cummings, 45 Pa. Super. 211, 215 (1911). In view of the freedom they
have, attempts to influence juries are either very infrequent or largely unreported.
While an attempt to bribe a juror is a misdemeanor, accepting a bribe is a felony.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4303 (1963). When a bribery attempt is made known, it
poses the double-edged problem to the trial judge of whether to continue, and risk
prejudicing the cause of a party innocent of complicity, or to dismiss the jury and
thereby encourage the practice. His decision binges on an immediate investigation
and appraisal of the effect of the attempt on the entire pinel. Commonwealth v.
Deutsch, 72 Pa. Super. 298 (1919) ; Commonwealth v. Tilly, 33 Pa. Super. 35 (1907).
In Mix v. No. Am. Co., 209 Pa. 636, 59 Atd. 272 (1904), the failure to investigate
was held to be cause for a new trial, since it left the jury with an unfavorable
impression of the party to whose benefit the attempt was directed.
54. Only the Supreme Court has the power to change venue due to inflammatory
newspaper reporting. Commonwealth v. Sacarakis, 196 Pa. Super. 455, 175 A.2d
127 (1961).
55. Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 178 Pa. Super. 434, 115 A.2d 826 (1955)
Commonwealth v. Cummings, 45 Pa. Super. 211 (1911); Commonwealth v. Helwig,
40 Erie Co. L.J. 64 (Pa. O.&T. 1956). The usual rule applies that a juror will not
be excluded from service merely from having read newspaper reports, provided he
has not formed a fixed opinion. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d
828 (1958) ; Myers v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 308 (1875). But see note 25, supro,
and accompanying text.
56. See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 130 F. Supp. 270, 285-89 and
nn.43-47 (M.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd, 224 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 454, 76
S.Ct. 965 (1956).
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bility has been abandoned and that harm has been done or that resulting
harm is but the natural and probable inference from the publication com-
plained of, it is the duty of the trial judge to grant a new trial.57
V.
CONCLUSION
In dealing with problems of impartiality of the jury the law is faced
with a dilemma. It must seek on one hand to preserve relentlessly the
ideals of a legal system in which the jury is both keystone and trademark.
On the other, it must meet the problems posed by using laymen for the
delicate task of resolving disputes, without employing burdensome struc-
tures that could only serve to defeat their own purpose by alienating the
people. It is ironic that as our society has increased in both material
affluence and education, the law, instead of being able to maintain rigid
standards of selection and conduct, has had to make significant concessions:
from the juror of no opinion to the juror of no fixed opinion, from the
inseparable jury to something less than that. To the credit of jurisprudence
the changes that have been made are founded on rational concessions to
human nature and changing times. But in the answer to one problem it
cannot help but be conjectured that others have been created. If a juror
may enter the box with a predisposition, however slight, doesn't this
theoretically result in a corresponding shift in the burden of proof, decreas-
ing it for the favored party and increasing it for his opponent?
Again, some fault must be found with the practice of judges interrogat-
ing prospective jurors who profess initially to have a fixed belief bearing
on the issues of the case. The rationale of permitting anything more than
a cursory inquiry in such circumstances must rest on either of two
grounds: that the jurist does not believe the opinion to be unshakeable,
or he feels the panelist is attempting to evade duty. If the former is true,
then the question of qualification becomes a difficult one of degree of
mental fixation; if the latter, it should be more easily remedied than by
saddling the litigant. In either event, it is unlikely that the situation recurs
frequently enough to justify the coercion involved and the possible
prejudice to an impartial trial.
Michael B. Kean
57. Commonwealth v. Deutsch, 72 Pa. Super. 298 (1919). But, on review, thegrant or refusal of the new trial is treated as a matter of discretion and will not be
reversed in the absence of a clear abuse. Commonwealth v. Crotefund, 85 Pa. Super. 7(1925) ; Commonwealth v. Valverdi, 32 Pa. Super. 241 (1906), off'd, 218 Pa. 7, 66 Atl.
877 (1907).
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